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ABSTRACT: 
 
The enigma of Kashmir is unending.  All analyses in respect of its solution seem 
mere repetitions of hackneyed recommendations.  This paper is a confession of 
that disappointment.  As a sequel to an earlier contribution to Heidelberg Papers 
(Working Paper No. 7, September 2002) the argument here that it is meaningless 
to find a solution to the problem simply through better governance in Kashmir as 
Delhi tends to suggest.  Governance per se though critical in any social strife is of 
relatively less importance in Kashmir where the critical issue continues to be the 
legitimacy of Indian rule, an unresolved subject of Partition.  To complicate 
matters is the issue of Muslim sense of frustration, justified or unjustified, across 
the globe in which the US role first as a Cold Warrior nation and then as a post-
Cold Warrior arbiter of international order is of critical implication.  All this 
makes Kashmir a meeting point of four sets of interests represented by Kashmiris, 
Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans.  Lately, because of the Afghanistan 
connection, even the interests of the ‘international Islamic jihad’ have been mixed 
in the brew.  As a consequence of this complex blend all solutions elude Kashmir.  
Stoically speaking, probably providence will ultimately determine the fate of this 
hapless paradise. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One man‟s beard is on fire, and another man  
warms his hands on it. 
             —A Kashmiri proverb 
 
                                                 
1
 An original version of this paper was presented in a seminar on „Post-Election Challenges 
in J&K‟ held in Sri Nagar on 26-27 October 2009.  The seminar was organized by the 
Institute of Peace Research and Action, New Delhi, and the Jammu and Kashmir Initiative 
for Peace, Sri Nagar, 
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With considerable amount of trepidation I am writing this paper.  The reason is that 
on the subject called Kashmir I feel I have come to my wits end and there is 
nothing I write will make any difference to its readers.  More than a decade ago I 
indirectly argued that let India push a diplomatic offensive against Pakistan by 
offering a plebiscite in the valley on the exact terms laid down by the United 
Nations (Mainstream, 1996).  My logic was that, in the first place, it would be 
extremely difficult for Pakistan to agree to the suggestion thereby blunting its case 
for plebiscite, and secondly, if after 50 years of democratic and federal 
experimentation India still did not have the courage to risk a vote in Kashmir it had 
no business to claim the loyalty of the Kashmiris.  There was no taker of my 
suggestion—nobody bothered to disagree with me even by writing a letter to the 
editor.  My suggestion, in short, was junked. 
 
Six years later, I came out, through a contribution in the Heidelberg Papers, 
with yet another suggestion that let India and Pakistan settle the dispute for good 
by internationalizing the Line of Control (Working Paper No. 7, September 2002).  
There was no taker of this idea either at the policy levels though several scholars 
referred to the article in their academic research.  Lately, however, Pakistan seems 
to be veering to that end as its two recent policies tend to suggest: one, its politico-
administrative package for the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Northern Areas), and two, 
its decision to seek Chinese help for the development of „Azad Kashmir‟, that is 
how Pakistan designates the part of Kashmir under its control.  But by opposing 
both the moves India seems to suggest that it has not changed its Kashmir policy 
and it still considers the entire J&K as one unit and for it, therefore, no question 
arises of making LOC the international border between the two nations. 
 
Unfortunately, however, in both the above mentioned writings I could not rise 
above my sense of nationalism.  Although I was apparently suggesting ways and 
means to both India and Pakistan to get out of the Kashmir quagmire with innocent 
and non-partisan advices yet at the back of my mind my Indian background and 
Indian training were dictating my logic—and therein lay the problem of 
International Relations (IR) research which in most cases fails to transcend the 
self-defined boundary of patriotism.  If this present paper also suffers from the 
same handicap the problem is to be found in this patriotism syndrome.  That day 
the problem of Kashmir will see light at the end of the tunnel when a Pakistani will 
be able to plead India‟s case and an Indian will be able to plead Pakistan‟s case 
from the same platform.  Alas, that situation is nowhere in sight. 
 
In the present paper yet another effort is being made to make sense of what is 
going on in the Kashmir Valley against the background of the State Assembly 
elections held in November-December 2008, some recent tensions over the 
allegations of human rights violations by the Indian security forces and the 
growing incidence of terrorism in Pakistan itself which is likely to spill over into 
the valley making an already unmanageable problem even more unmanageable.  
Since there always is an intellectual opinion in India which argues that at the core 
of the Kashmir problem is bad governance record of the state this paper looks into 
this complex relationship amongst governance, terrorism and the Pakistan factor to 
see whether good governance really has anything to do with the ultimate solution 
of the problem.  
 
It is argued here that bad governance, or for that matter even good 
governance, has nothing to do with the institution of terrorism.  Rather, if at all 
either has anything to do with it, it is probably good governance.  The proposition 
might sound weird at the first sight but once explained it would not appear that 
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way.  In modern times the early twentieth century Bengal had witnessed the first 
symptoms of terrorism in India which were aimed at the British rule.  Such names 
like Khudiram Bose or Prafulla Chaki had become household names in Bengal for 
their courage to challenge the might of the British Empire.  All Bengalis had 
admiration for them, no one any contempt.  But were these Bengali terrorists 
attacking the British for bad governance?  If not better, India was certainly not 
badly ruled by the British compared to what it is today.  The ire of these early 
terrorists was directed against the British government because according to them 
the latter as non-Indians had no business to rule India.  Their logic was: Good or 
bad, let India be ruled by its own people.  The core issue, therefore, is legitimacy of 
the rule, not its quality.  On the contrary, as stated above, good governance 
probably provokes the terrorists even more for their rationale to oppose the 
government becomes even more questionable.  Lately, however, governance as a 
concept has enlarged its scope and meaning providing some tangential justification 
to the terrorists which in the context of Kashmir is even more pronounced. 
 
The present paper is divided in five parts.  The first part is this introductory 
section itself.  The second part is a brief discussion on governance.  The idea here 
is to contextualize it to the problem of terrorism in Kashmir and argue that since 
the core point according to the terrorists is India‟s legitimacy to hold on to Kashmir 
it matters little to them how good or bad the state is run by the agents of the Indian 
state.  Still, certain elements in the governance debate, such as human rights, have 
intimate connection with militancy and they have been factored in our discussion, 
particularly in the third part.  The third part takes up only two aspects of terrorism 
in Kashmir as the subject otherwise is well dissected.  These two aspects are, 
namely, one, the growing incidence of suicide terrorism that makes the 
preparations for counter-terrorism less and less efficacious thereby creating a 
vicious cycle of increased violence, and two, the issue of human rights violation by 
the Indian security forces which has the potentiality to further erode the legitimacy 
of the Indian state to the advantage of the terrorists.  The fourth part highlights the 
most critical element in the quagmire, that is, the unfinished task of the Partition, 
namely, the dispute between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir.  The 
basic logic of the conflict remains exactly where it was in 1947 whatever India 
may have done to integrate the state into the Indian Union.   To complicate matters 
is the murky path that Pakistan politics has taken in the intervening period.  
Already the Pakistan army had emerged as the most dominant stakeholder in state 
politics which of late has been joined by the Islamist militants sometimes as its 
partners and at other times as its rivals thereby making the future of Pakistan even 
more unpredictable.  This unpredictability of the Pakistani state makes the solution 
of the Kashmir problem more elusive.  Keeping all these factors in mind our 
conclusion, which constitutes the fifth part, cannot be anything but tentative—with 
no road map towards solution, leaving virtually everything to providence which in 
intellectual jargon we call forces of history. 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE
3
  
 
It is a strange coincidence that the late 1980s and early 1990s when the present 
phase of insurgency in Kashmir was beginning to throw up a major challenge to 
the Indian state was also the time when the debate over governance was picking up 
its momentum as never before.  That was also the time when the post-Cold War 
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dynamics of global politics were unfolding.  Governance as a concept which 
classically meant the manner, action or system of governing was getting critically 
dissected the result of which was that by the beginning of the 21
st
 Century it came 
to encompass an entire gamut of issues at the core of which was politics.  This 
journey that started from a managerial approach to administration to a political 
approach to administration produced an enormous amount of literature on the 
subject in which academics, policy practitioners, inter-governmental and donor 
agencies and journalists contributed substantively. 
 
In the beginning the governance discourse primarily concentrated on a set of 
two approaches, namely, rules and steering, and a set of two issues, namely, 
literacy rates, employment rates, etc. on the one hand, and participation, access, 
equitable distribution, etc. on the other.  But as the debate developed the concept 
Getting Politics Right became the central element of the discourse.  As a result the 
aid agencies increasingly tied up their grants to such certifications as legitimacy of 
the grantee states, the commitments of the latter to such democratic institutions like 
media freedom, transparency in decision-making, promoting accountability 
mechanisms, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.  Or, as Neera 
Chandhoke proposes, we should enlarge the scope of governance much further: 
 
The state has been pluralized.  What remains of the significance or meaning 
of the liberal democratic notion of the state as the undisputed centre of 
political aspirations and its task of pursuing the collective interest when it 
itself has been enmeshed in a number of organisations?  How do we 
democratise bodies that are out of the reach of representation?  How do we 
ensure that democratic procedures take into account background inequalities?  
Governance in other words has thrown up major challenges for the liberal 
democratic project, and we need to think this through.  Or should we raise 
new questions for the project of governance itself?  This is the question (2003: 
2967). 
 
 
By and large, insofar as the governance indicators are concerned, the World Bank 
has identified six parameters with which progress or decline in governance can be 
measured (Kaufmann, et al: 2009).  These indicators are: 
 
1. Voice and Accountability 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness 
4. Regulatory Quality 
5. Rule of Law 
6. Control of Corruption 
 
 
THE KASHMIR CONTEXT 
 
It is not easy to relate the complex theoretical questions mentioned above to the 
problem of terrorism in Kashmir.  Currently, the Centre of Law and Governance at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University is conducting a massive study to identify the 
governance indicators across the Indian states.  Unfortunately, however, neither 
J&K nor India‟s North East is within the purview of this survey.  As such, we do 
not have any hard data on governance record of Kashmir. 
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Given this handicap, to make the best out of a bad deal, we have to reconcile 
ourselves to whatever we know of the governance record of the Indian state and 
find its connection to Kashmir which is a part of India.  And, for that matter the 
governance record of Pakistan may as well be considered for it is also an interested 
party.  If one goes by the UN Human Development Index (HDI) over the years 
neither India nor Pakistan shows much promise in terms of human development.  
The HDI 2007, which ranks 182 countries in all, puts India at 134
th
 place where it 
was in the previous year also and Pakistan at the 141
st
 place which is one rank less 
than the previous year.  Compared to these two states Sri Lanka has a much better 
record and is placed at the 102
nd
 rank.  But does such an index necessarily help us 
to measure the governance index or for that matter such regional turmoil like the 
one in Kashmir?  In spite of a sustained and better human development record Sri 
Lanka had witnessed the gravest threat to its societal and territorial integrity in 
South Asia after the Bangladesh crisis.  The argument, therefore, is that it is too 
simplistic to see any direct connection between insurgency and terrorism on the 
one hand and good governance per se on the other.  In 2006-2007 Bangladesh 
democracy was under suspended animation and was under virtual military 
administration yet the same period witnessed a better human development 
performance by the state.  The HDI 2007 puts Bangladesh at the 146
th
 rank which 
is two places better than the previous year. 
 
Good governance by itself is a desirable goal but not the necessary condition 
to solve all inter-ethnic or nation building problems.  More directly speaking, the 
World Bank has ranked most of the nations of the world as per the six governance 
indicators which have been mentioned in the previous section.  According to those 
indicators, India‟s record of governance is better compared to that of Pakistan (see 
Table 1 and Table 2), and if so, it is logical to guess that the same must be true of 
the Indian part of Kashmir compared to the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). 
 
 
Table 1 
Indian Governance Indicators by Six Parameters, 1996-2008 
Parameters 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.12 0.32 0.26 0.38 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.45 
Political Stability & 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
-0.99 -0.87 -0.68 -0.98 -1.20 -0.90 -0.74 -0.90 -0.98 -0.99 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
Regulatory Quality -0.01 -0.39 -0.11 -0.36 -0.33 -0.36 -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21 
Rule of Law 0.34 0.23 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.12 
Control of 
Corruption 
1.79 1.94 2.27 2.24 2.44 2.36 2.53 2.49 2.62 2.32 
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Table 2 
Pakistani Governance Indicators by Six Parameters, 1996-2008 
Parameters 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Voice and 
Accountability 
-0.71 -0.74 -1.36 -1.19 -1.23 -1.20 -1.05 -0.98 -1.06 -1.01 
Political Stability & 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
-1.44 -1.34 -1.02 -1.56 -1.67 -1.68 -1.70 -1.94 -2.39 -2.61 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.54 -0.65 -0.66 -0.59 -0.56 -0.58 -0.55 -0.53 -0.60 -0.73 
Regulatory Quality -0.38 -0.47 -0.70 -0.80 -0.73 -0.89 -0.59 -0.44 -0.56 -0.47 
Rule of Law -0.55 -0.73 -0.81 -0.79 -0.83 -0.88 -0.89 -0.85 -0.95 -0.92 
Control of 
Corruption 
-1.04 -0.83 -0.72 -0.81 -0.73 -1.05 -0.99 -0.76 -0.13 -0.15 
 
Note: More the estimate, better the success. 
Sources for both tables: Daniel Kaufmann , Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 
2009. Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 
1996-2008. Policy Research Working Paper 4978. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank: 80-97. 
 
The basic question is that governance and democracy are supposed to be closely 
intertwined.  If so, Kashmir‟s democratic record, meaning thereby fairly and 
peacefully conducted elections and the smooth transfer of power to the newly 
elected representatives should be considered crucial in identifying the governance 
indicators of the state.  But the problem is that Indian and Pakistani analysts see the 
results from two totally different perspectives making it difficult to arrive at any 
scientifically drawn conclusion.  Here are two representative samples in respect of 
the J&K assembly elections held in November-December 2008. Amitabh Mattoo, 
an Indian and a keen student of Kashmir affairs, wrote in the Economic and 
Political Weekly: 
 
Through the 1950s and the 1960s, stage-managed elections were seen as 
betrayal of the „trust‟ of 1947.4  The 1977 election, the fairest the state had 
witnessed since independence, became a leit motif of faith and 
accommodation.  The 1987 election, neither free nor fair, paved the way for 
militancy in the state.  Confidence in the democratic process was restored 
considerably when, for the first time ever, in 2002, the electorate was able to 
dislodge the ruling party.  The 2008 election will also be recognised as a 
marker for its inclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds (Mattoo 
2009: 39, emphasis added). 
                                                 
4
 In the 1951 Kashmir elections Sheikh Abdullah rejected almost all the nomination papers 
of his opponents as a result of which he won 73 of 75 seats.  Jawaharlal Nehru was 
complicit in this sabotage (Aiyar 2008). 
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In contrast, Awais Wasi of the Islamabad-based Institute of Policy Studies 
commented on the same elections in the following words: 
 
The state assembly does not have any mandate to determine the status of J&K.  
Therefore, the elections and their results have no bearing whatsoever on the 
people‟s decision concerning freedom or accession…. If the assembly 
elections had been the yardstick for measuring the freedom sentiments in the 
valley, the urge for freedom would have died down long ago and people would 
have accepted the state‟s accession to India.  But this did not happen; rather, 
the call for freedom has intensified with time.  The emergence of the mass 
uprising calling for freedom in the valley in 2008 and 2009 is a case in point 
(Wasi 2009: 11). 
 
The crux of the matter is that the rules of the game that India and Pakistan accept 
are diametrically different and as such there is never a meeting point. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
 
Before one finds the connection between the phenomenon of terrorism and that of 
suicide terrorism, in this case in the Kashmir context, it is imperative to understand 
the meaning of terrorism itself.  The definition of terrorism is still contentious 
though a general agreement seems to be emerging in the academic literature, which 
is: „Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service 
political ends.  It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider 
target group than the immediate victims of the violence and to publicize a cause, as 
well as to coerce a target into assenting to the terrorist aims.  Terrorism may be 
used on its own or as part of a wider unconventional war‟ (Wilkinson 2007: 72).  In 
the particular context of Kashmir Stephen Cohen equates the terrorists, both the 
Pakistan-sponsored and the home-grown, to theatre artists who have three types of 
audience in mind, the enemies, the bystanders and the potential recruits.  In the first 
case the enemy is the Indian state which is forced to retaliate and each such 
retaliation tends to „decrease its own legitimacy and make the terrorist or freedom 
fighter the defender of Kashmiris‟.  The bystanders are the public in general.  More 
they are unimpressed by violence more violence is to be perpetrated till they find it 
unavoidable to get involved in the affairs of the terrorists.  The third category of 
„potential recruits‟ whose moral justification to join the ranks is based on the 
theory that „the death of many innocents who happen to be on the side of evil can 
thus be rebalanced by the death of a few martyrs who are on the side of good‟ 
(Cohen 2006: 193). 
 
Sometime ago, at the 2002 Kuala Lumpur conference of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad, a 
key U.S. ally in cracking the al-Qaida, proposed that all attacks targeting civilians 
be considered terrorism.  This definition, if accepted, would have included not only 
all terrorist organizations but also many of the armed forces including India‟s own.   
Even Yasser Arafat‟s al Fatah would not have been spared.  In any case, Israel had 
branded Arafat as the most dangerous terrorist.  As could be expected, there was no 
OIC consensus on the matter.  They were reluctant to label the Palestinian suicide 
bombers as terrorists arguing that their action was only part of a legitimate struggle 
against foreign occupation.  India used to argue the same way about the LTTE in 
the teeth of protests from Sri Lanka.  It was only the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
that made India change its stance. 
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The term „suicide‟ by itself implies an extreme act of passion.  If so, should all 
acts of suicide bombing carried out by terrorists be branded as mere fanatical acts 
requiring psychological treatment?  A ten-year data-set for the period preceding 
9/11 shows that eight countries were the victims of the phenomenon of which 
Israel was the worst hit.  It accounted for 40% of the total 554 deaths caused by 
suicide attacks.  India‟s share was 7%.  Most of the suicide bombers were in their 
late teens or early twenties.  Till the LTTE terrorist bombers included even young 
women into the cadre general agreement was that they were all men (Gupta 2002).  
It may be emphasized that suicide bombings are not spontaneous outbursts of 
emotion.  They are carefully calculated strategic moves by the leadership of the 
terrorist groups.  According to one of the noted authorities on the subject: 
 
In fact, the leaders can simply turn on or off suicide bombings like a spigot, as 
part of their strategic move.  They recruit their human weapons by using the 
same techniques as any other cult groups with paranoid world view, where 
threats to the community become paramount and immediate…. Also, suicide 
bombings rarely carry any military significance.  The kamikaze pilots failed 
to stop the advancing US naval forces to Japan; neither it is likely that Israel 
will vanish from the map as a result of these attacks.  However, the impacts of 
suicide bombings on the global stage far outweigh their numbers (Gupta 
2002). 
 
In Kashmir the first evidence of suicide bombing was noticed in the aftermath of 
the Kargil conflict.  In August 1999 a group of the Lashkar-e-Toiba activists blew 
them up while storming a BSF post in Kupwara.  During the following two years 
about 50 suicide attacks took place in the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region 
several of which were aimed to gain entry or blast their way into high-security 
government installations.  These targets included an army garrison in the Red Fort 
(22 December 2000), the J&K Assembly (1 October 2001), and the Indian 
Parliament (13 December 2001).  Most of the suicide attacks were done either by 
the Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed who called the suicide bombers as 
fidayeen (those who make the supreme sacrifice) and khudkush shaheed dusta 
(voluntary martyrs‟ squad), respectively (Ramachandran 2002).  The Indian state 
felt helpless.  Kashmir‟s Inspector-General of Police, K. Rajendra, conceded that 
„no one can stop anyone who is prepared to die‟.  According to Syed Tayyab Shah, 
a Kashmiri Muslim cleric: „If jihad is undertaken according to the strict 
instructions of the Quran, suicide missions can be allowed if they offer military or 
strategic advantage to the Muslim Army.‟  Ghulam Mohammad, a Kashmiri 
sociologist, explained the phenomenon in these words:  „Disillusionment with their 
surroundings is the main reason why youngsters are drawn to seek refuge in 
religious fanaticism.‟  He argued that many Muslims saw the jihad as a means to 
purify the soul which a fidayeen stretched to dramatic effect hoping for instant 
purification.  It was instant and glorious (The Asian Age, 16 December 2001).  One 
must also try to rationalize this psychology in the context of what was happening to 
the Muslim sense of pride during and prior to this period.  The events that preceded 
and followed the 9/11, in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, caused almost two 
million Muslim deaths which made many Pakistanis see this as a „Muslim 
Holocaust‟ (Ali 2008, Ghosh 2008).  The way the Muslims criticized America and 
the way they gave their tongue-in-cheek rationalization of what happened on 9/11, 
tended to suggest that they attributed their perceived misery across the world, 
particularly in West Asia, to America‟s global role.  Israel was their bete noire.  
There was an undercurrent of nostalgia about the glory that was Islam.  One Indian 
psychologist who interviewed a number of Muslim terrorists in Delhi‟s Tihar Jail, 
mostly operating in Kashmir, found that one essential element in their 
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indoctrination was to remind them over and over again of their glorious past.  None 
of them had any repentance for their violent acts and tended to suggest that given 
chance they would again and again indulge in such acts for their cause was just.
5
 
 
As the number of the suicide attacks grew in several parts of the world the 
failure of the concerned state to curb them through punitive actions became more 
manifest.  One strategy which was theoretically plausible was to draw the suicide 
squads and their leaders into a larger negotiation process like the Sri Lankan state 
had from time to time done (Gupta and Mundra 2005: 591).  But like the Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad in the Israeli context neither the Lashkar-e-Toiba nor the 
Jaish-e-Mohammed was willing to compromise on their demand, that is, total 
independence of Kashmir from the control of the Indian Union.  Under the 
circumstances the Indian state has no option other than either dealing with the 
situation militarily or somehow or the other convince the Pakistani state that they 
were playing with fire and one day the flames would inevitably engulf them as 
well.  In short it has nothing much to do with the improvement of the J&K 
administration except improving the state‟s human rights record which has direct 
connection with the justification for terrorist activities that we will discuss below. 
 
 
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Insofar as the question of human rights is concerned most states abhor the 
tendencies of other states to discuss these matters as they are often found 
tendentious.  This is so notwithstanding the fact that there is an International 
Declaration of Human Rights and all democratic countries call for their protection.  
India has its own National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to serve as a 
watchdog against any violation of human rights.  But when the same NHRC 
indicted the government of Gujarat for its failure to contain the anti-Muslim riots in 
the state in March 2002 it came in for criticism by none other than the ruling party 
in Gujarat itself, the BJP.  Since the latter was the dominant partner in the ruling 
coalition at the Centre this criticism assumed more serious meaning.  There were 
even charges that the party had edited the NHRC report in such a way so as to 
mean that the Gujarat Government did its job satisfactorily and it was only the 
media that tarnished its image by selectively quoting from the report.  It was, 
however, exactly the other way around.  Of course subsequent developments have 
overtaken the controversy and the complicity of the Gujarat government in the 
anti-Muslim massacre has by now become an open secret. 
 
In the context of Kashmir the violation of human rights by the security forces 
is a constant complaint the latest evidence being the Shopian case of rape and 
murder of two young women.  Theoretically it is explained that in trying to locate 
the sources of popular support for the terrorists ordinary citizens are subjected to 
torture.  Sociologist Veena Das has called it „surrogate punishment‟.  In the context 
of what happened in Sri Lanka she wrote: 
 
In a situation in which militants or terrorists deliberately terrorise civilian 
population into providing them with food and shelter, it becomes difficult for 
any army to distinguish between the civilians and the militants.  The nature of 
violence that an army has to face in the case of an internal insurgency is not 
what they have been trained to recognise as the violence of warfare.  Hence 
                                                 
5
 The psychologist is Rajat Mitra, Director, Swanchetan, a Delhi based NGO.  This author 
has discussed the subject with him on several occasions. 
Partha S. Ghosh 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 4 ,  M a r c h  2 0 1 0                                                     10 
reason gives way to panic; instruments for „disciplining‟ a population become 
not open warfare but torture, detention, rape.  Nothing shows the irrationality 
of this violence better than the widespread use of rape of girls and women and 
murder of children.  As many torture victims testified, they were tortured not 
because they had crucial information to give but because every time the 
soldiers faced unexpected violence from the militants and suffered heavy 
losses, they tortured the people detained as a kind of surrogate punishment.  
Even after the withdrawal of the IPKF [Indian Peace Keeping Force] the same 
pattern of civilian reprisals was followed by the Sri Lankan army (see her 
„Foreword‟ in Somasundaram 1998: 14-15). 
 
The above syndrome can be witnessed in any comparable situation whether it 
is Kashmir, North East or Gujarat.  Shopian is not Kashmir‟s first such experience.  
In 2000 also there was a goof up about the DNA test.  Following the 
Chittsinghpora massacre of some Sikhs in the Anantnag district, in a joint police-
army operation in March 2000 five allegedly Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists were 
killed.  But the local Muslim community alleged that the killed persons were their 
relatives who had nothing to do with the Lashkar.  When the protests mounted and 
the J&K government was under growing public pressure it ordered for the 
exhumation of the bodies for the DNA test.  The idea was to prove once for all that 
they were indeed Lashkar men and not local youths.  But when exhumed, five 
families identified the charred, decomposed bodies as those of their relatives who 
had gone missing after the Chittsinghpora incident.  The J&K government, 
however, insisted that no action could be taken against the security personnel until 
DNA testing conclusively proved the identity of the five bodies.  Following this the 
DNA samples were collected from the bodies and from their eight relatives and 
sent in April 2000 to the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics, 
Hyderabad, an autonomous institute under the Department of Science and 
Technology of the Government of India.  To ensure that the tests would prove 
negative, the officials apparently tampered with the relatives‟ DNA samples.  
Naturally the samples did not match but an alert press (in this case the Times of 
India) exposed a massive cover-up operation in which even the samples taken from 
females were submitted as those of men. 
 
In the controversy between terrorism and human rights 9/11 would remain a 
landmark;  never before had the United States been exposed to such a massive 
attack from the terrorists threatening the lives of its nationals on their own soil.  
The response of the country was, therefore, massive.  It was feared that while 
employing its foreign policy instruments, such as covert action, military assistance, 
etc., to rope in other countries into America‟s war against terrorism, the United 
States might lower its guard against violation of human rights in these partner 
countries.  While releasing the 670-page Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, 
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of the organization, cautioned that the „terrorists 
believe that anything goes in the name of their cause.  The fight against terror must 
not buy into that logic.  Human rights principles must not be compromised in the 
name of any cause…. The fight against terror isn‟t just a matter of security.  It is a 
matter of values.‟  He added: „In societies where basic freedoms flourish, citizens 
can press their government to respond to grievances.  But in Saudi Arabia and 
other countries where Osama bin Laden strikes a chord of resentment, governments 
prohibit political debate.  As the option of peaceful political change is closed off, 
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the voices of non-violent dissent are frequently upstaged by advocates of violent 
opposition.‟6 
 
It is naïve to think that the menace of terrorism in Kashmir can be eliminated 
easily.  It is equally naïve to think that in its efforts to counter the problem of 
terrorism the Indian state would be free from allegations of human rights violation.  
Since both would remain coexistent realities the only pragmatic policy is the one 
that balances the two.  Since India is a plural society such balancing becomes even 
more important for otherwise inter-communal tensions would go out of bounds.  
Terrorists operating in Kashmir would love to see the situation in the state escalate 
into a Hindu-Muslim conflict inviting the Hindu fanatical outfits join the fray in a 
big way.  If that happens, it will be an even greater challenge for the Indian state to 
deal with if Gujarat teaches us any lesson.  After visiting the camps in Ahmedabad, 
where the Muslim victims of Gujarat riots were sheltered, the former Mumbai 
police chief Julio Ribeiro had written: „I visited the Shah Alam camp where nearly 
10,000 Muslims had been accommodated after their homes were burnt and looted 
and their relatives raped and killed.  I had expected histrionics and wailing but I 
was astounded at the matter of fact manner in which young boys and girls 
recounted the sordid details of what they had seen and experienced.  It gave me an 
uneasy feeling that these young people were not going to forget the injustices 
heaped on them.  I do not know if the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, who had been 
gloating over their “success” in Guajrat, visualised the danger to which they are 
exposing their innocent co-religionists somewhere, sometime in the future‟ 
(Ribeiro
 
2002).  It is unthinkable that Kashmiri terrorists do not take advantage of 
such developments in other parts of India.  It may be underlined that the expulsion 
of the Hindus from the Valley, which was largely engineered by non-local 
terrorists, was in line with the same strategy. 
 
 
THE PAK-AFGHAN-KASHMIR LINK 
 
The problem of Kashmir is essentially rooted in the original conflict between 
Indian National Congress and the Muslim League which the partition of India 
could not solve.  On the contrary certain unfinished tasks of that exercise allowed 
the ghost of Partition to haunt the bilateral relations for ever thereafter.  And in this 
Pakistan‟s sense of frustration is even more than that of India.  Leave alone 
Kashmir it has not reconciled itself even to the „loss‟ of Junagarh to India.  Not 
only the Pakistani school maps, even the Website of the Pakistan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, still shows Junagarh and Manavadar as parts of Pakistan.
7
  No 
wonder that Pakistan has so far fought three-and-a-half wars (Kargil is the half 
war) with India and for the last two decades fighting a non-conventional, low-
intensity, and low-cost war in the Kashmir Valley.  Ever since 9/11 when 
Afghanistan was roped in the US grand strategy to combat terrorism across the 
world Pakistan has tried to get yet another pretext to complicate the scene to its 
advantage.  But how far has it really succeeded in that venture is of course an open 
question for records suggest that it combines three contradictory roles at one go.  It 
is the victim of terrorism, it is the sponsor of terrorism and it is also the country 
that has killed and arrested more terrorists than any other country (Riedel 2008: 
355). 
                                                 
6
 Human Rights Watch Press Release, 16 January 2002. 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/01/wr2002.htm. 
7
 http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Maps/PAK_Administrative.jpg, accessed on 11 September 2009.  
Strangely, however, the „Political Map‟ provided by the same Website does not include the 
two areas. 
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Immediately after 9/11 Pakistan was not so willing to go along with the 
United States in its war against terrorism.  But as President George Bush insisted 
upon a clear and unambiguous commitment from Pakistan, or else getting itself 
branded as an enemy of America, Pakistan was left with no choice.  It was this 
commitment that irked the Islamists.  To wriggle out of this quagmire President 
Pervez Musharraf came out with a justification, which was rather well reasoned 
out.  His argued that his support for the US anti-terrorist stance was motivated by 
the fear that in the post-Cold War phase the Americans might come closer to India 
and the latter by taking advantage of the situation could get them on their side to 
solve the Kashmir problem in India‟s favour (Riedel 2008: 358).  Pakistan‟s larger 
involvement in the Kashmir militancy in the aftermath of the American military 
action in Afghanistan following 9/11 fitted the bill. 
 
 
PAKISTAN’S CIVIL-MILITARY TANGLE 
 
Pakistan‟s involvement in the Kashmir problem is a permanent fixture in the 
nation‟s politics.  If so, does it make any difference when there is a democratic set-
up in the country and the army seems to be willing to accept the civilian 
superiority.  Given the checkered history of democracy in Pakistan it is too early to 
be predictive but the way Pakistani army has reacted to the recent US aid package 
contained in the Kerry-Lugar bill does not augur well for civilian rule in the 
country.  The army top commanders through a carefully drafted press statement, 
which itself is a departure from the past when most such press statements were 
short and of a routine nature, have expressed their „serious concern‟ on some of the 
clauses of the bill that they believed would affect „national security‟.  There are 
straws in the wind pointing to a perceptional gap between the Asif Ali Zardari 
government and the army.  While leaders like President Zardari and the 
Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira have hailed the bill as a great piece of 
legislation and a pro-democracy sentiment the army has objected to its reference to 
Pakistan‟s nuclear programme, its counter-terrorist efforts and the civilian 
government‟s role in military appointments and promotions.  One may see some 
glimpse of an impending civil-military face-off on such matters in the following 
statement of the presidential spokesperson, Farhatullah Babar, who tried to dispel 
the perception that accepting aid under the bill would mean that the army and its 
intelligence agencies were aiding the terrorists.  He clarified that the former 
president Musharraf had pledged to the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee on 6 January 2004 that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used 
by the terrorists.  Babar wondered: „If it was not considered an admission that time, 
why this fuss now?‟ (Dawn.com, accessed from Internet on 23 October 2009). 
 
Under the shadow of the military Pakistan‟s democracy always raises 
questions about its survival.  The democratic institutions in Pakistan are still fragile 
while the army is a well-knit body of professionals which has tasted power for long 
years.  How would the latter reconcile itself to a civilian authority to which it 
would be answerable is a concern for all democratically minded Pakistanis.  
According to a US-based Pakistani scholar: 
 
Democracy in Pakistan is likely to remain stillborn unless the officer corps‟ 
praetorian norms and prerogatives undergo erosion and the military is brought 
under firm democratic-civilian control.  The growing internal threat from 
terrorism, and the sense of public insecurity that it generates, do not augur 
well for democratic civil-military relations.  For now, Pakistan‟s „resurrected 
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civil society‟ will likely ensure that the military has no real occasion openly to 
undermine or overthrow an elected government.  But some form of 
authoritarian backsliding with at least a hidden or partly hidden assist from 
the military must still be considered a not unlikely outcome for Pakistan 
(Shah 2008: 24). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In September 2009 the Government of India approved a plan outlay of Rs. 65 
billion for J&K for the year 2009-10.  The outlay was 40 per cent more than the 
previous year‟s outlay.  Its objective was to neutralize discontent.  In addition to 
this outlay the fund under the Prime Minister‟s Reconstruction Plan (PMRP), 
which aims at improving infrastructure in the state, was also doubled from Rs. 
10,120 million to Rs. 24,170 million for the same fiscal year (Hindustan Times, 24 
September 2009).  More development assistance is always welcome but as we have 
argued in the second part of this paper dealing with governance that it is not the 
only solution to the tangled problem of Kashmir.  Rather if there is no effective 
utilization of these huge funds and corruption swallows large chunks of it is 
inevitable that a portion of that booty would reach the terrorists to further 
complications.  Now that the state is under a dynamic and forward looking young 
leadership it may be wishfully thought that things might change but much will 
depend on his capacity of Getting Politics Right (see page 5).  And this political 
task encompasses several things, namely, relations with the Indian centre, relations 
with the opposition in the state, playing to the Kashmiri gallery both within the 
valley and beyond, and over and above supplying necessary inputs into India‟s 
foreign policy insofar as it is concerned with Pakistan and the United States.  A tall 
order, indeed! 
There are two ways of looking at the present state of insurgency in Kashmir, 
one, as a virtually Pakistan-sponsored threat with limited local support, and two, as 
an externally-sponsored threat but with massive local support.  If it is the former 
case it is going to be a war of attrition which the Indian state is capable of handling 
for many more years.  If the situation falls in the second category it is more 
problematic for it warrants adept political handling both at the domestic and 
international levels.  But the question of mass support is always dicey for who 
really decides when a movement becomes a mass movement is ever debatable.  
Who would deny that the Quit India movement of 1942 was a mass movement?  
But has anyone looked into the fact that while only 100,000 people joined it 
another 2,500,000 people fought in the Second World War on behalf of the British 
Empire exactly during the same time (Aiyar 2008).  Do the numbers always matter, 
therefore?  This enigma cannot be easily resolved by political theories, much more 
so in the Kashmir context.  As such, probably just like the Cold War came to an 
end without giving any prior notice, the problem of Kashmir too could well be 
solved one day to the surprise of all Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis.  Amen! 
 
 
 
 
 
Partha S. Ghosh 
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